I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s and 1990s, the criminal justice system in the United States became increasingly punitive. This Article describes the move toward greater punitiveness and contrasts this development in the United States with the restorative justice movement in Australia and New Zea1and. Though punitiveness, rather than restorative justice, has been the dominant theme in American criminal justice po1icy, there are programs now operating in the United States that fit the restorative justice mode!.
To date, restorative justice in the United States has operated at the fringes of the criminai justice system with small programs, often run by churches and 'private agencies, handling a relative1y small number ofjuveni1e cases and cases involving minor offenses. By contrast, in many countries restorative justice is now fully in the mainstream, and in some countries restorative justice hand1es the majority ofcases invo1ving adult offenders. What are the prospects for widespread adoption of restorative justice principles and a substantial restructuring of the crimina1 justice system in the United States to accommodate those princip1es? Is the American public prepared to tum from punitive policies to restorative justice?
As a background to the issue ofthe public's receptivity to restorative justice principles and po1icies, this Article first reviews the punitive policies ofthe 1980s and 1990s and the dramatic declines in American crime rates during the last decade. The sharply declining crime rate might mean the time is ripe for a switch from punitive to restorative criminaljustice policies, and there is some evidence that public anxiety about crime is starting to decrease and that support for punitive po1icies has declined. There are, however, severa1 significant barriers to the adoption ofrestorative justice princip1es, including: (l) the market-driven media, which has an incentive to stress crime stories and frame them in a fashion that supports punitive responses and cues racial attitudes, (2) a political system that rewards the candidates and parties that play the "crime card," and (3) a recent emphasis on sentencing principles that are difficult to square with restorative justice practices. ' OF THE 1980s AND 1990s In the United States, a movement to restructure the sentencing process and increase sentence severity began in the late 1970s and continued throughout the 1990s as imprisonment rates swelled to unprecedented levels. The rehabilitative ideaI, which dominated postwar penaI theory and praetice in the United States, l suffered a "wide and precipitous decline" in the 1970s, attacked by both conservatives and liberals. 2 As the rehabilitative ideaI collapsed, it was replaced by an ideology of "crime prevention through incapacitation"3 and an increasing emphasis on retribution as a goal of criminal sentencing. 4 The change in penaI theory was expressed in legislation that rejected the goal ofrehabilitation and in indeterminate sentencing regimes intended to tailor imprisonment to the individuaI offender's need for rehabilitation. Many jurisdictions adopted mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the 1980s, 5 and there was a similar but more comprehensive trend at the federaI level involving both mandatory minimum penalty statutes and more severe and rigid federaI sentencing guidelines. 6 In the 1990s, as the new higher sentences took effect, they were supplemented in many states with highly punitive recidivist statutes, many based upon California' s "three strikes" law. 7 Although these statutes vary from CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 7 (I995) (noting that " [f] or most of the twentieth century, the concept ofrehabilitation has dominated penai policy and practice" and "was the law's stated objective in the criminal sentencing system"). For a discussion of the rehabilitative view toward prisons, see Ilene H. Nagel, Foreword: Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federai Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 893-95 (1990) .
2ALLEN, supra note I, at 7. Opposition to the rehabilitative ideai crossed ideologicaI lines, incIuding police chiefs, district attorneys, Quakers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Prisoners Union. On the one hand, rehabilitation was criticized by groups incIuding radical criminoIogists and civiI libertarians who saw it as a threat to the political vaIues of a free society and who expressed concern that the rehabilitative ideai had, in practice, proven particularly vulnerable Io misuse.Id. at 39-56. Others argued that, given the limits ofscientific knowledge and institutionaI capabilities, society was incapable ofrehabilitating offenders. Id. at 57. 3fd. at IO. 4See. e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME : A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW No.1] STILL TOUGH ON CRIME? 415 jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the new recidivist statutes provide that the sentence for a third, or in some cases a second, qualifying offense will be doubled or increased to life without parole. By the end of the 1990s, the combined effects of the sentencing changes brought about significant increases in the duration of incarceration served by offenders and in the rates of imprisonment in the United States. For example, in the federai courts, the average sentence imposed in 1995 for some crimes was nearly double that imposed in 1980. 8 Moreover, federai offenders sentenced in 1998 for certain crimes will spend about twice as long in prison, on average, as did offenders sentenced in 1984. 9 In 2001, it was estimated that the rate of imprisonment in the United States was 699 per 100,000 population, the highest in the world. IO In comparison, the imprisonment rates for other Westero nations fell within the range of forty to 125 per 100,000. 11 The shift toward a punitive focus can also be seen in the treatment ofjuvenile offenders. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a fundamental shift in juvenile justice policy occurred in the United States, and the treatment of serious and violent juvenile offenders experienced a major change. Between 1992 and 1996, forty states adopted or modified laws, making it easier to prosecute juveniles as adu1ts in criminal court, and forty-seven states and the District of Columbia changed their laws targetingjuveniles who commit serious or violent crimes. 12 In contrast to the traditional regime, which based dispositions on the needs of the juvenile with the goal ofrehabilitation, the states have increasingly shifted to dispositions that are based upon the offense with the goal of punishment. 13 As a result, more juveniles than ever before are being charged and tried in criminal court, detained analogy: afterthree strikes you are "out"-i.e., subject to an enhanced penalty, which in California is a mandatory Iife sentence. After California and Washington adopted their three strikes laws in 1994, twenty-two states and the federai government adopted new laws enhancing punishments for repeat felony offenders. See generally JOHN CLARK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 9-10 (1997), available at http: //www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/165369.pdf; MichaeIG.Turneretal..ThreeStrikesandYou·re Out Legislation: A National Assessment, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995 , at 16, 17. 8Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federai Sentence Severity: 1980 -1998 ,12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 12, 17 (1999 Another manifestation of the punitive character of the contemporary American criminai justice system is the death penalty, which is authorized in thirty-eight states and in the federai system. 16 There have been more than 800 executions since 1976, when the Supreme Court upheld the validity ofa revised Georgia death penalty statute that has become the model for many other state statutes,17 and 3,692 persons were under death sentences in the United States as of January 1,2003. 18 Although the expansion ofthe death row population is due primarily to the cumulative effect of a low ratio of executions to death sentences imposed, the number of death sentences imposed yearly has also increased significantly.19 Strong support for the death penalty has been manifested in Congress,lO and the pr~eath penalty culture seems to have influenced judicial 104-132, 110 StaI. 1214 104-132, 110 StaI. (1996 , provides ti me Iimits within which any collateral challenge to a capitai sentence must be filed, sets time limits for judicial decisions in capitaI cases, and precludes subsequent challenges. 
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STILL TOUGH ON CRIME? 417 decisions as wel1. 2 \ As discussed in greater detail in Part IV.A, generai public support for the death penalty has dropped slightly since the mid-1990s, but a poli conducted in July 2001 indicated that approximately two-thirds ofthe public stili support il. 22 Public opinion polls in the United States throughout the 1990s demonstrated high levels ofanxiety about crime and strong support for more punitive measures. Americans were concemed about crime and wanted harsher measures to deal~ith il. National polls identified crime as the most important problem facing the nation from 1994 to 1998, and from 1999 to 200 l crime was selected as the second-or third-most important national problem. 23 Most Americans thought-and continue to think-that harsher sentences should be imposed. For twenty years, a random nationwide public opinion poli asked, "In generai, do you think the courts in [your] area deaI too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?"24 Every year from 1980 to 1996 more than 78% responded, "Not harshly enough.,,25 Although the percentage ofrespondents who say sentences are not harsh enough fell to 68% in 2000 (the last year for which data is avaHable),26 that is still a very high rate of consensus.
In generai, there was widespread public support for the punitive laws and policies noted above. For example, public opinion polls generally showed strong support for the adoption of"three strikes" laws and sexual offenders notification provisions,27 and legislators viewed any opposition to these provisions as akin to political suicide.2 8 Indeed, Democratic candidates tried to defeat the impression 21lndeed, in one case in which the lower courts had granted repeated stays of execution, the Supreme Court took the unprecedented step of ruling that no further stays could be entered in the case without the Court's pennission. See Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1992 23See id. at tb1.2.1 (noting that in 2002, concem about crime fell precipitously, replaced by concern about terrorism, war, and economy).
24See id. at tb1.2.54 (reporting public attitudes towards judicial severity between 1984 and 2000); Hofer & Semisch, sl/pra note 8, at 17 (reporting same for years 1980 to 1982). From 1980 to 1995 the percentage responding "[n]ot harshly enough" remained between 80% and 86% in every year but 1987, when it slipped to 79%; the proportion responding "[n]ot harshly enough" fell to 78% in 1996 78% in , 74% in 1998 78% in , and 68% in 2000 that they were not as tough on crime as Republicans, and candidates and parties often seemed to try to outdo one another with punitive anticrime initiatives. At the federaI level, draconian crime bills were passed by wide majorities every two years just before the congressional elections. 29
III. THE RESTORATIVE JVSTICE MOVEMENT
Restorative justice has been defined as "a process of bringing together the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by the crime," with the goal of restoring victims, offenders, and communities in a way that alI stakeholders agree is just.30 The system is based upon the recognition that crime harms individuals (victims) and relationships (the victims' and offenders' respective communities).
The restorative justice model is often defined in opposition to the punitive model. 31 In contrast to the United States justice system, which is designed to establish the culpability ofthe offender and to exact an appropriate punishment, the aim of restorative justice is to establish accountability for the harm, promote mutuaI understanding of its causes and effects, and develop a process to make amends. 32 In the restorative justice paradigm, the offender is not ordinarily incarcerated, but instead is obligated to apologize and otherwise compensate the victim, ideally receive forgiveness, and be reintegrated into the community.33
The restorative justice movement has been very influential in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, particularly in the area of juvenile justice, and it is gradually being extended to more cases involving adults. The movement became more prominent throughout the 1990s, strongly influenced by the indigenous proposed three strikes legislation because of fear ofvoter reprisals in upcoming election); see also Daniel M. Filler, Making the Casefor Megan 's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315,351 (2001) (noting that congressmen believed it was politically impossible to oppose passage offederal Megan's Law).
29See ANTHONY KING, RUNNING SCAREO: WHY AMERICA'S POLITICIANS CAMPAIGN Too MUCH ANO GOVERN TOO LITILE 138--41 (1997) . For a discussion of these bills, see, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age ofFederaI Sentencing: The Opportunity and Needjor Judicial Lawmaking, II STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 99 (1999) (describing sentencing provisions passed in conjunction with federai election cycle in 1986, 1988, and 1990) ; see also Sara Sun Beale, What 's Law Got To Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-LegaI Factors Injluencing the Development of(Federal) Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 23, 40--44 (1997) (describing political treatment of crime from 1960s to 1990s at federallevel); Harry A. Chemoff et al., The Politics ofCrime, 33 HARV. l. ON LEGIS. 527, 538--42 (1996) practices ofthe First Nation communities in Canada and the Maori tribes in New Zealand. 34 In Canada, native peoples employed "circle sentencing or healing," a process that involved offenders, victims, and their respective families and community supporters in a discussion ofthe causes, consequences, and remedies for the crime. 35 Native circles of healing have addressed serious offenses, including domestic violence, sexual assault, and intrafamily sexual abuse. 36 More formai victim-offender mediation programs in several large Canadian cities handle adult and juvenile offenses such as assault and breaking and entering. 37 New Zealand adopted legislation in 1989 based on traditional Maori conflict resolution practices that emphasized the direct involvement of the family and community ofjuvenile offenders in developing a pian to rehabilitate them through "family group conferencing.,,38 The primary function of family group conferencing was to decide whether to prosecute the offender and to decide about custody arrangements or alternative sanctions. 39 Under the new law, diversion of juvenile offenders to family group conferencing reduced the number of cases going to court by approximately 80% and cut juvenile incarceration by half. 40 After more than a decade ofexperience with juveniles, family group conferencing is now being extended to adults. Restorative justice programs in Australia are generally based upon the New Zealand conferencing model, except that the police play a more prominent role in the process through an approach called Wagga-Wagga, named for the area where it was developed. 41 As the restorative justice 34Braithwaite, supra note 30, at 1743. 37See Mark S. Umbreit, Restorative Justice Through Mediation: The Impact ojPrograms in Four Canadian Provinces, in INT'L PERSPECTIVES, supra note 36, at 373, 379 (reporting results of programs operating in Calgary, Langley, Ottawa, and Winnipeg: 39% of 4445 cases referred in these four cities between 1991 and 1993 were mediated and 93% of these resulted in successfully negotiated agreements; additionally, more than three-quarters ofvictims and offenders reported high levels of satisfaction with mediation process and perceived it as fair 40Ctr. for Restorative Justice and Peacemaking, Univo of Minn., Fact Sheet: The Impact of Restorative Justice 2 (Jan. 3, 1997) (finding reduction from 10,000 to 13,000 cases before passage to 2587 in 1990, and reduction ofincarceratedjuveniles from 262 in 1988 to 112 in 1990), available at http://ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/Resources/Documents/cumb97a. pdf.
41See Strang, supra note 35, at 6 (describing originai Wagga-Wagga program in New South Wales that led to passage of Young Offenders Act of 1997, which became modeI for other provinces). The most prominent program not statutorily based is run by the Australian Federai Police in the Australian Capitai Territory (ACT) and is undergoing continuous evaluation under the auspices ofthe Reintegrative Shaming Experiments (RISE) of Australian National University. Id.
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[2003: 413 programs were incorporated into provincial legislation, state juvenile justice institutions largely took over implementation, although police were still involved in referring cases to conferencing and participating as facilitators in the mediation. 42 Currently Australian restorative justice programs focus mainly on juveniles, although three jurisdictions extend conferencing to adult offenders. 43 The most common offenses referred to these programs are robbery, breaking and entering, property damage, disorderly conduct, motor vehicle theft, and assault.44 Restorative justice programs are also flourishing in Europe, particularly in Austria, Germany, and Finland. In Austria, victim-offender mediation has been part of the juvenile justice system since the mid-1980s, offering offenders the options of a reconciliation talk, compensation for damage done, or symbolic restitution through community service or payments to a public welfare organization rather than an individuaI victim. 45 Mediation is also available for adult offenders on a limited basis. 46 Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1994 in Germany, mediation was made formally available as an option to adult offenders where the penalty under regular proceedings would be a prison sentence ofup to a year orjust a fine. 47 Interestingly, in both Austria and Germany, victim-offender mediation is used for more serious crimes than in other countries. In Germany, about 70% of the cases mediated in 1995 were violent crimes, and in Austria nearly three-quarters ofthe adult cases mediated involved violent interaction, such as barroom brawls or road rage. 48 In Finland, despite the fact that victim-offender programs operate outside the formaI criminaljustice system, they handle as much as 20% ofthe caseload. 49 at 23-25.
421d. at 6 (noting that programs in Tasmania, Northern Territory, and ACT use police officers as conferencing facilitators, that in other states and territories police officers assist in mediation as part of conferencing team or have formai role, such as reading out charges against offender, and additionally that police are major source of referrals for cases in almost ali states and territories). 46See id. at 69-70 (noting that 2000 adult offender cases were resolved through mediation in 1995 in four major pilot cities, compared to 66,444 adults who were formally convicted nationwide in same year).
47Jd. at 68 (stating that, in theory, more than 95% of criminal cases in Germany would have been eligible for this form of diversionary mediation).
48Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235,269 (2000) ; see also Loschnig-Gspandl & Kilchling, supra note 45, at 72 (describing cases mediated in 1992: 20% situational conflicts, 25% conflicts at work, 14% family contlicts, and 30-40% without personal element).
49Kurki, supra note 48, at 269 (noting that victim-offender mediation accounted for 6300 offenders in 1993, compared to total of 23, 181 offenders sentenced in 1995).
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Although there is increasing interest in restorative justice in the United States,50 restorative justice principles have been adopted mainly in scattered smallscale programs dealing with minor offenses. The most popular form ofrestorative justice in the United States is victim-offender mediation. Nearly 300 victimoffender mediation programs now exist throughout the United States. 51 Approximately half of the programs deal exclusively with juveniles,52 and most employ victim-offender mediation in cases involving offenses such as vandalism, minor assaults, theft, and burglary.53 More than halfofthese programs are funded or sponsored by churches or other private community organizations, though they may also receive govemmental funding. 54 Although there are a few very large programs, most are small. The average victim-offender program for juveniles receives 136 referrals per year, and the average program dealing with adults receives seventy-four. 55 Other restorative justice practices, such as family group counseling, have been adopted in a smaller number of communities. 56
Reparative probation and other citizen boards are being used to dispose of minor crimes in Vermont and other jurisdictions in the United States. There are adult citizen panels adjudicating nonviolentjuvenile offenses in many cities, and reparative citizen boards are now widely used in Vermont.57 The Vermont program, unlike other restorative justice initiatives in the United States, was implemented statewide by a govemment agency pursuant to a law adopted by Vermont voters. By 1998, the Vermont reparative justice citizen boards were handling 1200 cases, a large share ofVermont's relatively small caseload. 58 52 Id. at 5-6 (noting that 45% of programs worked exclusively with juveniles, 47% worked with both juveniles and adults, and 9% worked exclusively with adults).
531d. at 7. 541d. at 6 (stating that 43% are sponsored by "[p]rivate, eommunity-based ageney" and 22% are sponsored by "Chureh-l;Jased organization"). Fifty-seven pereent of programs identified the loeal, state, or federaI government as the primary souree oftheir funds. Id. (noting that 27% reeeive their primary funding from loeal govemment, 24% from state government, and 6% from federaI govemment).
551d. at 7. 58Kurki, supra note 48, at 283 (noting that 1200 eases handled in 1998 were "more than onethird of the targeted probation easeload"). United States restorative justice programs have just touched the surface, with the focus on low-Ievel offenses and offenders. What are the prospects for more widespread adoption? Will the United States copy the increasing success and prominence of restorative justice initiatives in other countries? Will these programs become centraI features of the justice system?
A. A Wìndow ofOpportunìty?
At first glance, it might seem that the time is ripe for the United States to tum to restorative justice. We have taken punitiveness as far-and farther-than any other country. There is not much room to go further down that road, and many reasons point towards pursuing other altematives. Restorative justice could appeal to conservatives who want to cut state budgets and to liberals who deplore the human costs of incarcerating such a significant part ofthe population. Moreover, the United States has experienced a record-setting decline in crime rates. Homicide and robbery rates feH to their lowest levels since the late 1960s,59 and serious violent crime continued to decline in 2000,60 reaching its lowest level in the twenty-seven-year history of the National Crime Victimization Survey.61 AdditionaHy, property crime, inCluding larceny, burglary, theft in generaI, and motor vehicle theft, continued a twenty-year decline. 62
There is some support for the common sense idea that public anxiety about crime and sUPPort for punitive policies are responses to high crime rates. For example, one researcher found that approximately two-thirds of the variation in public support for the death penalty could be explained by variations in the crime rate. 63 According to this logic, the current drop in crime rates should correlate with less punitive attitudes, and indeed it appears there has been some softening 59Bureau of Justiee Statisties, U.S. Dep't of Justiee, Additional Crime Facts at a Glance, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/gve.htm (lastrevisedDee.11 ,2002 in publie support for the death penalty, whieh began dropping in the mid-1990s. Between May 1995 and May 2001, support for the death penalty fell from 77% to 65%.64 When respondents were given the ehoiee oflife imprisonment with no possibility of parole as an alternative punishment for murder, a national survey eondueted in 2000 found that support for the death penalty dropped to 52%.65 State surveys found that respondents preferred the option of life without parole plus the payment of restitution from work in prison (LWOP+R) over the death penalty by a signifieant majority. Sixty-four pereent of Nebraskans favored LWOP+R, as did 73% ofNew Yorkers. 66 A similar softening may be oeeurring in eonneetion with attitudes about sentenee harshness. In 1994, 85% of respondents reported that 10eal eourts were "not harsh enough" in dealing with eriminals; that number fell to 74% in 1998 and 68% in 2000. 67 Similarly, other attitudes related to punitiveness are also starting to show a ehange. A poll eondueted in 2000 found that 68% ofthe publie believed that "attaeking social problems" is the best approaeh to 10wering the erime rate, as opposed to 27% who favored more money for additional prisons, poliee, and judges. 68 This was a signifieant ehange from 1994, when 42% of the publie favored more spending for law enforeement and just 51 % wanted to attaek social eauses. 69 In 2002, Peter Hart published the results from two national telephone surveys and six foeus groups, whieh he argues demonstrate a "signifieant transformation" and a fundamentally different perspeetive that rejeets purely punitive approaehes to eriminal justiee. 70 Hart found inereased support for prevention rather than punishment and for alternative sentenees for nonviolent offenders, espeeially drug offenders, as well as deereased support for mandatory sentenees. 71 He also found signifieant1y inereased support for rehabilitation. 72 These attitudes are fertile ground for restorative justiee proposals.
B. Barriers to Acceptance
Although these polls may be harbingers of ehange, there are signifieant barriers to the adoption of restorative justiee prineiples in the United States. The first barrier is the potential linkage between punitive polieies and lower erime 424 UTAHLAWREVIEW
[2003: 413 rates. Two other important factors, which operated throughout the 1990s, are the news media's heavy focus on crime and violence, and the political system's rewards for the candidates and parties that have played the "crime card." These factors can increase public fear of crime and strengthen support for punitive measures. Research into the effects of the psychology of cognition and risk assessment provides models that suggest how these effects may be amplified by common cognitive errors. Another element ofthe equation is the fit between the restorative justice and the sentencing reforrn movements. Restorative justice may face an uphill batde to the extent that restorative justice proposals seem at odds with the popular sentencing reforrns ofrecent years. Finally, the tragic events of September Il, 2001 , and the resulting focus on terrorism, have introduced a new factor that may make it more difficult to focus on reforrns not direcdy linked to public safety.
The Perception That Punitive Policies Keep Crime Rates Low
The most obvious barrier to the adoption of restorative justice policies may be the perceived link between the increasingly punitive policies ofthe last twenty years and the drop in crime rates over the past decade. If harsh policies are necessary to reduce crime, then falling crime rates provide no occasion for taking a new direction.
It is by no means clear that the punitive policies ofthe 1980s and 1990s are the principal cause ofthe current reduction in crime (though they have certainly played some role). Many scholars believe that social forces operating independently ofpunitive legislation, such as an improvement in the economy and changes in the drug culture, are responsible for most of the recent drop in American crime rates. 73 This conclusion is in line with the traditional view that altering sentencing policies has relatively little inf1uence on crime rates. 74 there is evidence that the U.S. has pushed increases in sentencing severity to the point that the marginaI returns in crime reduction are quite small, and are more costly than other crime reduction strategies. 75 Determining the precise relationship between the punitive policies discussed above and crime rates is beyond the scope of this Artiele, but several related points warrant further discussion here. In considering whether the U.S. will be receptive to restorative justice initiatives, the criticaI point will be whether the policymakers and the public think restorative justice initiatives are likely to increase crime-regardless whether this view is supported by criminal justice scholarship. Moreover, politicians and the media play a criticaI role in shaping the public's attitudes on criminaljustice policy. The impact ofthe news media and the political process in shaping public opinion is discussed in the sections that follow.
The News Media 's Focus on Crime
Television coverage ofcrime rose meteorically in the first halfof the 1990s, with national television coverage of crime reaching historicallevels in 1995. 76 In that year, the number of crime stories on the three major networks' national evening news shows matched the amount of stories about the first Gulf War and presidential campaign when those events were unfolding. 77 Similarly, during that period crime and violence were also a staple of local news and the entertainment industry.78 Although the number ofcrime stories on the nightly news fell from the high-water mark in the mid-1990s, by the end of the decade the networks stili were airing five times as many crime stories as they were ten years earlier. 79 Crime was the number one story on local television news throughout the 1990s, though stations varied in their coverage ofcrime and violence. 80 Crime accounted Effects (1978) , and National Academy of Sciences Panel on the Understanding and ControI of Violent Behavior (1993) in support of conc1usion that "[t]here is widespread agreement over time and space that alterations in sentencing policies are unlikely substantial1y to influence crime rates"). This view, however, is not unanimous. See Beale, supra note 29, at 25 n.9 (identifying some criminal justice scholars taking this minority view).
75See generally Beale, supra note 29, at 26-27 (citing conc1usion of paneI of National Academy ofSciences that increase in probability of detection would prevent twice as much violent crime as increase in length of incarceration); id. at 30 (citing conclusion of RAND Corporation report that preventative measures are significant!y more cost effective than longer incarceration); cf Spelman, supra note 73 (noting that $20 billion spent annual1y on prison expansion since the early 1990s could provide child care to every family that cannot afford il, college education to every high school graduate, or Iiving wage to every unemployed youth).
76Beale, supra note 29, at 45. 771d. (noting that there were 2574 crime stories on evening news programs in 1995, compared with 2604 stories about GulfWar in 1991 and 2427 stories about presidential campaign in 1992). for an average of 20% to 30% of the typieai loeai news broadeast, with some ehannels devoting as mueh as 42%.81
Thus, television viewers in the United States were deluged during the 1990s with erime stories on the national and loeal news. These traditional broadeasts were buttressed with crime news from newer media sourees, particularly the networks' proliferating news magazines and the eable news ehannels. Network news magazines-whieh viewers see as news programs, though their producers characterize them as entertainment-proliferated in the 1990s and devoted 20% to 40% of their broadcasts to crime stories. 82 Cabie news networks aiso dove heaviIy into tabloid-style crime coverage, which could generate large increases in viewership. For exampIe, the heavy tabIoid-styIe coverage ofthe disappearance of Washington intero Chandra Levy in the summer of 2001 was credited with increasing the viewing audiences ofCNN and the Fox News Channel by 44% and 136%, respectiveIy, over the same period the prior year. 83
This crime coverage was driven largely by economic and marketing considerations, rather than traditional journalistic considerations. In the case of local news, the nature and extent of crime coverage did not correlate with the crime rates in the viewing area. 84 lnstead, the content and styIe of local news broadcasts are driven IargeIy by marketing considerations and varied by the perceived tastes ofthe Iocal audience, as well as the station's attempt to carve out a distinctive niche in its locai market. 85 SimiIarIy, the increase in national primetime coverage of local crime stories appears to be a response to economic pressures within the television industry.86 Certainly it did not correlate with crime rates, which, as noted above, fell precipitously during the 1990s. It should be noted that during the same period the entertainment media also provided viewers with a diet full of crime and violence. For example, one study of television Beale 84HAMILTON, supra note 80, at 239 (deseribing study of 16,000 loeal news stories from fiftyseven stations in nineteen different markets whieh found that emphasis on erime in loeal news depends not on actual erime in area but on viewer interest in violent programming, and that, eontrolling for many demographie faetors, viewers who report higher eonsumption of violent entertainrnent programs are more likely to wateh loeal news with erime emphasis and to follow national or intemational news stories that involve violence, such as reports on military confliets).
85See general/y Beale, supra note 80 (discussing effect of media's increased emphasis on violenee on public's attitude toward crime and criminal justiee polieies).
861d. at 12.
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STILL TOUGH ON CRIME? 427 content in 1998 to 1999 found that there were an average of eighteen serious scenes ofviolence per hour in both broadcast and cable television,87 Crime and violence in the media can affect public opinion either directly, by increasing the fear of crime and perceptions of the frequency of crime, or indirectly, by setting the public's agenda to increase the salience of crime as a political issue.
There is a correlation between an individuai' s consumption ofprogramming depicting crime and violence and his or her greater fear of crime and more exaggerated perception of crime rates,88 Some researchers have concluded that television viewing causes these exaggerated views. 89 This line of thinking is sometimes called the "cultivation hypothesis," which posits that repeated viewing ofviolent episodes cultivates the viewer's misleading impression ofthe frequency ofsuch activity in the real world,90 Although the cultivation hypothesis has some common sense appeal, it suffers from an important limitation: correlation does not demonstrate any cause and effect relationship, It may be that those with exaggerated fears of crime select programming that reflects their views, To date, there has been no demonstration that viewing violence causes viewers to have increased fears of crime or to believe that crime is more frequent,91
Other research, which stands on a firmer footing, establishes that the news media play an important role in setting the public agenda, Le., determining which issues the public believes to be most important. 92 This effect is most pronounced when media is viewers' chief source of public information and less significant when the public has a great deal of personal contact and information,93 This agenda-setting research provides an explanation for the continuing salience ofthe crime issue throughout the 1990s at a time when crime rates were falling to historically low levels. Most people's sense of the seriousness of the crime " 87S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., HOLLYWOOD CLEANS UP ITS ACT: CHANGING RATES OF SEX AND VIOLENCE IN ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA tbI.3 (2002) , available at http://www.cmpa.comlarchive/2002popcultreport.htm. 88See generally Beale, supra note 29, at 47--49 (discussing research on effect of crime and violence in media).
891d. he cuitivation hypothesis is most closely associated with the work ofGeorge Gerbner. See, e.g., George Gerbner & Larry Gross, Living with Television: The Violence Profile, 26 J. COMM. 173, 178-79 (1976) (discussing long-range study of trends in television contents and efTects). For a discussion ofGerbner's work and its critics, see RICHARD SPARKS, TELEVISION AND THE ORAMA OF CRIME: MORAL TALES AND THE PLACE OF CRIME IN PUBLIC LIFE 86-93 (1992) ; see also Beale, supra note 29, al 48 (noting that SCI. REv. 848 (1982) ). problem appears to be based upon what they have seen or read in the news, rather than on their personal experience. 94 For these individuals, the news media's constant focus on crime stories implicitly sends the message that crime is one of the most pressing issues facing our nation. Public opinion polIs reflect the fact that many members ofthe public may have accepted this message,95 at least in the absence of more obviously pressing social problems. In that sense, the attacks of September Il, 200 l, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the economic turmoil folIowing the collapse ofhuge companies like Emon, have demonstrated that real news can force tabloid crime stories off center stage.
The Political Story-Rewards for Playing the Crime Card
A political focus on crime has supplemented the media's focus. In the last third of the twentieth century, crime became a hot political topic in the United States, and politicians have vied to be the toughest on crime. 96 After the Republicans deliberately adopted a "tough on crime" strategy in the late 1960s, they won almost every presidential election between 1968 and 1988; the only exception was 1976, on the heels ofRichard Nixon's resignation. The crime issue was so successful that Democrats decided to fight fire with fire. Bill Clinton campaigned-and won-on his record as a pro-death penalty governor who would use federaI funds to hire more local police. 97 Congressional Democrats recognized that their traditional emphasis on liberaI crime policies had become a major politicalliability, and they shifted ground to take that issue away from the Republicans. 98 Within Congress, mammoth crime bills passed with little opposition in the fall before each congressional election, despite the draconian penalties they imposed. 99 One article concluded that "control ofthe crime issue is a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, requirement for political victory in America."IOO 
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Much of the recent federai crime legislation can be explained as symbolic politics, which deliberately exploits the public's fear of crime. 101 Indeed, a comparative study by Anthony King concluded that various features of the American political system produce extreme electoral vulnerability and thereby create much greater incentives for empty symbolic actions that play on public fears than do the British or German systems. In contrast to their British and German counterparts, King found that American members of Congress devoted a far greater share oftheir time to consideration of, and participation in, political activities to raise money and support for their next reelection campaign, and far less time to consideration of substantive issues. 102 As a result, more legislative action in the United States is devoted to ensuring reelection than to solving underlying problems. In King's view, this feature of the hyper-democratic American electoral system manifests itself dramatically in criminal justice legislation. 103 Viewing crime legislation as symbolic politics fits well with interest group models ofthe political system's function. 104 Powerful special interest groups can demand legislation conferring tangible benefits. In contrast, politicians can placate the generaI public with legislation or administrative action that provides only empty symbolic gestures.
Moreover, current punitive policies are strongly supported by two key interest groups that have a financial stake in continuing current policies and the increased rates ofimprisonment. 105 The individuals and groups that build and staff prisons have a strong financial interest in policies that will maintain or increase the rate of imprisonment and are an increasingly important political force. 106 For example, the union representing correctional workers in California was the largest IOISee, e.g., KlNG, supra note 29, at 138--41 (1997) (discussing politicians' fraudulent use of phrase "war on crime" as illustration of symbolic politics); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Toolfor Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1227 , 1247 -53 (2000 (describing federaI hate crime statutes as symbolic politics); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Congressional Re-election Through Symbolic Politics: The Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1,29 (1994) ("Merely passing a law can make an anxious public feel better."); Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Policies in Clinton 's Crime Control Agenda, I BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 67, 67 (1997) ("Since crime cannot be significantly reduced through legislation, politicians must rely on symbolic policies to convey the message that they are doing something to solve the problem.").
102KiNG, supra note 29, at 43--46. 103/d. at 140-54. I04For a generai introduction to interest group theory, see OANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW ANO PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTROOUCTION 12-37 (1991) (discussing political impact of interest groups as viewed from perspective of political science and economics). Interest group theory is discussed in the context of federaI crime legislation in Beale, supra note 101, at 1248-53.
IOSSee Bruce Shapiro, Victims and Vengeance: Why the Victims' Rights Amendment Is a Bad Idea, THE NATION, Feb. IO, 1997 , at II, available at 1997 1061d. [2003 : 413 contributor to Governor Pete Wilson's 1994 In generaI, the victims' rights movement in the United States has also supported a political agenda of vindictiveness and punitiveness, ineluding the death penalty, harsher sentences, and pretrial incarceration. 108 Victims' rights programs are also direct beneficiaries of the current "tough on crime" policies because a large share of their funding comes from fines levied against those convicted of federaI crimes and their forfeited assets. 109 There are also direct alliances between some victims' rights groups and other interest groups that support the punitiveness agenda. For example, the Doris Tate Crime Victims' Bureau, which was a driving force behind California' s three-strikes legislation, received 78% of its funding from the state prison guards' union. IlO Although a survey of comparative political systems is beyond the scope of this Artiele, one historical fact tends to support the contrast Anthony King drew between the American system and those in which the criminal justice system is less punitive and restorative justice principles are more widely embraced. Death penalty scholars have noted the existence ofpopular support for the death penalty in other countries at the time ofabolition (and often thereafter). Abolition has not been the result of popular demand but of legislative action contrary to public opinion. 111 For example, when the British Parliament suspended the death penalty in 1965, only 21 % ofthe public favored abolition. "2 The vote in Parliament was treated as a vote of conscience. 113 No party discipline was imposed, and most members did not see this as an issue on which to canvas their constituents, but rather one on which they elected to exercise their own judgment. At the time of this action, the majority of the public stili favored the death penalty. Lord Windlesham called the decision "one of the most conspicuous, and courageous, ever taken by parliamentarians, irrespective of party, in the knowledge of the widespread extent of disapprovai for their actions.,,114 Although public opinion polls in Great Britain continued to show widespread support for the death 107Id. (noting that California Correctional Peace Officers Association provided 84% offunding for "Crime Victims United" Political Action Committee, which contributed significantly to Wilson's carnpaign Given the recent political history, it is difficult to imagine a majority of an American legislature taking such a position based upon conscience, in the face of strong public opposition. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the personal views of legislators would lead them away from punitive policies and toward restorative justice.
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Magnifying the Damage fra m Media and Politics-Cognitive Errors
Common cognitive errors also may have played a role in inflating public fear of crime and support for punitive policies in the United States. Several mechanisms that play a role in knowledge acquisition and attitude formation-availability, overgeneralization, (over) confidence, and biased processing of information-may ali play a role.
It is easy to see how the twin factors of availability and overgeneralization can affect the public's views on criminal justice policy. Cognitive availability plays a key role. Not ali events and occurrences are equally subject to OUT recall, and the availability heuristic biases judgment because some examples and events stand out and are recalled much more easily than others. In particular, unusual and startling events are much easier to recall (more available) than common ordinary events. Judgments can be biased because some examples and events are more available than others. Thus news reports of horrific crimes (or miscarriages of justice) may be easily recalled when members of the public think about the cri minaI justice system.
The tendency toward overgeneralization means that people base generaI views on a few cases or even a single case. Overgeneralization multiplies the effects ofavailability. For example, a highly publicized series ofabductions (and in several cases, murders) of children in 2002 (including Samantha Runnion, Elizabeth Smart, and Danielle Van Dam) may have led the public to believe there 115ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 111, at 12 (noting that in 1966, after suspension, 76% favored reintroduction, and support rose to 82% by 1975); Peter Hodgkinson, The United Kingdom and the European Union, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 112, at 193, 194-95 (noting that in 1992, for first time since 1950s, majority was opposed to restoration of death penalty for murder, with figures at 42% for restoration, 44% against restoration, and 14% undecided).
116Hodgk.inson, supra note 115, at 195. However, 66% favored restoration ofthe death penalty for terrorist murders. Id. at 196.
117Kristi Tumminello Pinzo, Note, The United States-"Capita!" olthe World: An Ana!ysis 01 Why the United States Practices Capita! Punishment While the lnternationa! Trend Is Toward lts Abolition, 24 BROOK. 1. INT'L L. 855, 887 (1999) .
118For example, a 1996 Dutch poli showed 52% ofthe population supported the death penalty. Thomas Sancton, A Matter olLife or Death, TIME (Europe), May 21, 2001, at 28. Despite public support for the death penalty, the Baltic states adopted the Sixth Protocol of tbe European Convention on Human Rights, regarding abolition ofthe death penalty, because oftbeir desire to be accepted into the European Union. Hodgkinson, supra note 112, at 635-38. [2003: 413 is an epidemic of such cases. In fact, there are 200 to 300 serious child abduction cases per year nationwide, of which fifty to 150 end in the child's murder. 119 Experts believe that the number of cases is stable or falling. 120 Given availability and overgeneralization, however, the media's focus on these cases may lead the public to perceive a crisis that calls for legaI reforms. 121 Once the public adopts the view that harsh measures are needed to deal with a crime wave or crisis, it is difficult to dispel this view. Even views based upon minimal information are typically held with great confidence. 122 Thus,judgments based upon sensational news reports about atypical cases may continue to hold sway, even if the media also reports contrary evidence. Once individuals hold a certain point of view, they process new information in a highly biased fashion consistent with their views. 123 These factors converge when public attitudes are founded on a visceral sense of danger, which can operate in an unconscious fashion that prompts us to vigilance. Intuitive responses based upon such cuing are held with great confidence and ordinarily cannot be altered by logical arguments or news reports suggesting a different point ofview. Psychologist Howard Margolis argues that members of the lay public who leam of risks or dangers tend to jump to one extreme view or another (i.e., to regard a situation as very serious and requiring action, not at all serious, or one where action might do more harm than good), and to remain locked into that view. 124 In the context of criminal justice policy, Margolis's analysis provides a good model for understanding how the media's focus on violent sensational crimes tends to promote the visceral sense of danger that prompts many people to jump to the conclusion that more action is needed to ensure public safety.125 This has been translated into calls for longer sentences for dangerous criminals. The hot cognition and affective responses that are provoked by violent crimes are especially strong and resistant to persuasion or arguments about the counterproductive effects of punitive proposals or the atypicality of the cases in questiono FinalIy, the restorative justice movement seems to be at odds with the sentencing reforms that are one ofthe halImarks ofthe 1980s and 1990s. By 1999, eighteen states and the federaI govemment had developed or implemented some form of sentencing guidelines. The main goals of these guidelines were to curb judicial and prosecutorial discretion, promote more uniform and consistent sentencing, and adjust punishment levels according to different categories of offenses and offenders. 126 The sentencing guidelines also assisted states in projecting funds needed for correctional facilities. 127 Depending on the state, sentencing guidelines reflected different philosophies. For example, ')ust deserts" or retribution was the underlying premise for the sentencing systems in Minnesota, Washington, and Oregon; whereas the Virginia framework reflected an incapacitation rationale. 128 Almost alI the sentencing guidelines reflected core principles that are in conflict with the restorative justice movement, namely, proportionality, uniformity, and transparency. Proportionality speaks to the match between the gravity of the offense and the sanction. Restorative justice does not use a standardized, objective measure of a crime's severity, but instead focuses on a subjective understanding ofthe harm done to a specific victim and considers the specific circumstances ofthe offender. 129 Uniformity requires that offenders with similar records, or who have committed similar offenses, receive similar punishments. By emphasizing individualized solutions, sentencing under a restorative justice scheme would not have uniform results. Finally, sentencing guidelines were designed to ensure that punishrnents be imposed in a transparent manner, according to clearly articulated rules. Restorative justice programs, in contrast, feature discretion in deciding punishments, something that the sentencing guidelines were designed to redress. 130 The sentencing reforms focusing on uniformity and proportionality have their greatest appeal in the cases of the most severe offenses, where the community's interest in public safety and the offender's interest in liberty are at their zenith. Despite the apparent conflict between restorative justice and sentencing systems, it has been suggested that there may be an opportunity for "restorative sentencing" for nonviolent, noncareer offenders who have committed minor crimes. 131 A potential model for incorporating restorative justice into 126For a generai discussion of the sentencing reform movement, see MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6-9, 27-30 (1996) ; Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and Federai Reformers, 6 FED. SENTENCING REp. 123, 123-26 (1993 Although the barriers to change are substantial, there are new factors in the equation. The presence of new situations and new information can serve as a catalyst for dramatic shifts in public opinion. In other contexts, such as fear of environrnental risks, public opinion has been shown to shift dramatically-flipflopping from one extreme to another-under certain conditions. 134 Although reasoned arguments cannot ordinarily shift an individuai' s opinions, an individuai confronting striking new events or information may suddenly reassess and adopt a new opinion (now held with equal ferver to the one just abandoned).135 Several new factors have appeared in the criminal justice equation that might have such an impact on public opinion.
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In the context ofthe death penalty, such a shift in public opinion may have been occurring before the terrorist attacks of September Il, 200 I. Researchers Phoebe Ellsworth and Samuel Gross identified a significant drop in support for the death penaltyl36 and several new factors creating a situation conducive to change in death penalty support: new information, a new script, and a new option. The existing news media "script" of guilty defendants stringing out the legai process through endless appeals based on technicalities l37 was supplanted by a new "script" of innocent death row inmates as victims of ineffective counsel ancl/or incompetent, unethical or racist police, who narrowly escaped execution for someone else's crime. 138 The new information carne from scientific evidence, DNA testing, that proved innocence reliably in several highly publicized cases. 139 A new option, a moratorium, was introduced, creating a middle ground that permitted death penalty supporters to reassess without reversing their position.1 40 At the same time, the Democrats' move toward matching the Republicans' punitive crime agenda made crime a less criticai issue politically and reduced the No.1] STILL TOUGH ON CRIME? 435
importance of the death penalty as a defining credential for a conservative. 141 Thus, several Republicans were leading figures in the moratorium movement. 142 It is not yet possible to determine whether the shift Gross and Ellsworth identified was derailed by the terrorist attacks. As they noted, death penalty attitudes can be strongly influenced by singular events, such as a mass murder,143 and polls taken after September Il show that death penalty support has remained constant or risen slightly.l44 It is too soon to say whether this is a momentary pause or another more permanent settling of public opinion.
In the broader context of criminal justice, state budgetary pressures are now creating pressures to rethink punitive approaches. By the midpoint of2002, many states were in serious financial difficulty; estimates of the total state budget shortfalls for fiscal year 2002 ranged from $27 to $38 billion. 145 One response to the budget shortfalls has been to reduce sentences and to repeal or limit mandatory minimum sentencing laws, which are now perceived as unnecessarily harsh and fiscally onerous. As one state correctional official observed, "budget problems are making people ask fundamental questions about whether we can afford to keep on doing what we've been doing.,,146
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Thirteen states modified their harsh sentencing laws in 200 l and 2002, and others had similar proposals under consideration. 147 Many of the legislative changes occurred in states led by Republicans,'48 and Republican governors in other states closed prisons as a cost-cutting measure. 149 Some states that once led the way on harsh sentencing laws are now seeking ways to cut their costs by measures that include reducing incarceration. Louisiana, for example, which has the highest per capita incarceration rate in the nation, enacted legislation eliminating mandatory sentences for certain nonviolent crimes. 150 The legislature also limited the application ofthe state's three strikes law. ' 51 It was estimated that the state will save $60 million per year in prison operating funds. 152
California, which passed the toughest three strikes law in the nation,153 exemplifies the conflicting currents. Voters have demonstrated support for some nonpunitive approaches, and the state faces the toughest fiscal pressures in the nation, but also counter pressures from key interest groups that favor a continuing emphasis on incarceration. In 2000, California voters approved Proposition 36, an initiative diverting nonviolent drug-possession offenders from prison into probation with court-mandated treatment. 154 It was estimated that the law would save the state $200 to $250 million annually, as well as $450 to $500 million of decreased prison construction funds. 155 California faced a state budget deficit of $23.6 billion in 2002,156 and prison expenditures-which now account for one of every fourteen dollars in the state generai fund l57 -seem like a logical piace to cut costs. But this move would not be popular with a key interest group: prison guards and their union, who have been among Governor Gray Davis's biggest campaign donors. 158 Despite estimates that budget deficit and rising costs would require the state education cuts of$954 million, the governor continued with plans to spend $335 million to build a new prison to hold the state's declining prison population. 159 In May 2003, after additional budget cuts the governor vetoed a bill estimated to cut costs by $70 million annually by enabling nonviolent prisoners to obtain early release dates to participate in work or education programs. 160
VI. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to say at this juncture whether the barriers to change are sufficient to shore up most punitive policies, or whether instead we are at a turning point, when support for punitive policies wanes sufficiently to permit restorative justice to become a major force. Given the conflicting factors noted above-including continuing media emphasis on crime, political benefits for politicians who appeal to the fear of crime, interest groups that benefit from high rates of incarceration, low crime rates, and state budget shortfalls-it would be difficult to predict the direction of public opinion even without the intrusion of several criticaI events in 2001 and 2002. The terrorist attacks ofSeptember 2001 and fear offuture attacks are a major source ofpublic anxiety whose implications for the issues discussed here are not yet clear. The public may see domestic acts of terrorism as entirely different from "normal" crime, or they might instead harden their attitudes toward all criminals. Further, the stock market collapse of 2002, accompanied by revelations ofwidespread corporate wrongdoing and rising unemployment rates will certainly affect public opinion, though again, the implications for penaI policy are unknown, beyond the obvious point that penalties for white collar criminals are being increased. 161 Finally, there are some indications that the violent crime rate may be starting to rise. 162 Just as falling crime rates may provide a favorable context for progressive criminal justice policies, rising crime rates may reignite calls for tougher measures.
